Risk-averse investors induce competitive intermediaries to hold safe assets, thereby lowering the probability of a run and reducing financial fragility. We revisit Goldstein and Pauzner (2005), who obtain a unique equilibrium in the banking model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) by introducing risky investment and noisy private signals. We show that, in the optimal demand-deposit contract subject to sequential service, banks hold safe assets to insure investors against investment risk. Consequently, fewer investors withdraw prematurely, which reduces the probability of a bank run. Safe asset holdings increase investor welfare and may increase the bank's provision of liquidity.
Introduction
While runs experienced in the recent financial crisis involved intermediation activities beyond traditional banking, the financial arrangement and the associated risk of runs often resembled those of traditional banks.
1 Financial intermediaries invest in risky assets funded by shortterm liabilities similar to demand deposits. These short-term liabilities allow investors to satisfy their liquidity needs, while participating in profitable long-term investments. The maturity mismatch of assets and liabilities expose intermediaries to the risk of runs. An investor's decision whether to roll over funding is determined by considerations about the risk of the intermediary's investment and the strategic behavior of other investors. Premature liquidation by some investors exerts a negative externality on those investors who roll over funding. Does the availability of a safe asset decrease financial fragility by mitigating runs?
In a seminal paper, Diamond and Dybvig (1983) analyze a setup with risk-less investment and risk-averse investors who face unobservable idiosyncratic liquidity risk. The first-best allocation provides liquidity risk-sharing among investors. A demand-deposit contract implements the first-best allocation by promising an interim return above the liquidation value of the investment. As a result, the demand-deposit contract is run-prone and two equilibria emerge. In the good equilibrium, only investors with liquidity needs withdraw prematurely. In the bad equilibrium, all investors withdraw, resulting in the bank's insolvency.
However, the probability of a run remains outside the perimeter of the analysis.
In another seminal paper, Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) introduce investment risk and noisy private information in the Diamond/Dybvig setup. They derive a unique equilibrium in which the probability of a bank run depends on the promised interim return. Resolving the multiplicity of equilibria allows for a meaningful examination of welfare, whereby the costs of a run ex post are internalized ex ante. That is, the bank's promised interim return trades off a larger run probability with enhanced liquidity provision (greater liquidity risk-sharing).
We expand the portfolio of the bank by introducing investment in a safe asset. Building on the Goldstein/Pauzner setup, banks can now hold safe assets, such as cash, government debt or central bank reserves. This allows the bank to insure those risk-averse investors who roll over funding by reducing their exposure to investment risk.
2 Expanding the analysis of Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) , we study the effect of safe assets holdings on financial stability. This allows us to examine the effect of both liquidity risk-sharing and insurance against investment risk on bank fragility.
3 More broadly, we aim to contribute to the ongoing discussion about the role of safe assets in society (Gorton et al. (2012) ).
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We show that safe asset holdings decrease the probability of a bank run and enhance financial stability. Banks can decrease the probability of a run by either providing less liquidity to investors or holding safe assets. The demand-deposit contract we analyze consists of two parts. First, the bank promises a non-contingent interim return to investors who withdraw prematurely. Second, after all withdrawing investors have been served, the bank may also liquidate more investment. Holding the proceeds as a safe asset offers insurance
against investment risk.
To analyze the withdrawal behavior of investors when the bank holds safe assets, we use the methods of one-sided strategic complementarity proposed by Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) . When the bank insures patient investors against investment risk, fewer investors withdraw prematurely. Thus, the probability of a bank run is overstated in Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) , and the ex-ante welfare of investors is understated. Figure 1 shows the unique thresholds with and without safe asset holdings as the interim return varies. Safe asset holdings also affect the optimal provision of liquidity. Revisiting the trade-off between liquidity provision and bank fragility, we derive the optimal interim-rate promised by a bank that holds safe assets. Numerical exercises and preliminary evaluation confirm our intuition that the ex-post insurance against investment risk allows the bank to provide more ex-ante insurance against liquidity risk. The rise in the optimal interim-rate with safe assets bridges part of the gap between the first-best interim-rate of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and the one in Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) . Figure 2 depicts the ex-ante expected utility with and without insurance against investment risk as the interim rate varies. It also shows that optimality with ex-post insurance against investment risk is achieved at a higher interim return than without insurance, implying greater ex-ante liquidity risk-sharing.
Figure 2: Expected utility and the interim return with and without safe asset holdings.
Besides showing the role of safe asset holdings in financial stability, we make some technical contributions to the literature. Most importantly, we show that the equilibrium threshold below which a run occurs is continuous in the noise. Continuity allows us to obtain a unique limit that was not otherwise guaranteed: uniqueness for every positive noise does not imply uniqueness with vanishing noise. Hence, we prove Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) 's conjecture about the existence of such a unique limit with vanishing noise. Second, we provide a condition for the lower dominance region to emerge naturally. Third, we provide a strictly tighter bound on the promised interim return, above which an investor wishes to withdraw prematurely, irrespective of the strategies of other investors. Fourth, we provide a more extensive treatment than the proofs in Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) . Some technical issues do arise, it is shown that these do not affect the main results.
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This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model. In section 3 we analyze a competitive bank's safe asset holdings. We study the impact of these holdings on the optimal withdrawal threshold in section 4. Section 4.1 contains an important technical contribution regarding the continuity of the withdrawal threshold. In section 4.2 we establish a link between the withdrawal threshold and the promised return, which gives rise to a trade-off between bank fragility and liquidity risk-sharing as in Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) . Finally, in section 5 we study how the withdrawal threshold, investor welfare and the bank's provision of liquidity are affected by safe asset holdings.
5 For example, the fact that the probability is strictly increasing does not guarantee that the net incentive integral is increasing in the fundamental. For small enough noise, this integral initially decreases as the fundamental increases. We show that there exists a level of the fundamental above which it increases, as in Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) . Furthermore, we show that the utility differential increases in the number of withdrawals, when the fundamental is in the upper dominance region. This result arises since the promised interim return is less than the liquidation value. This fact contrasts with the case when the fundamental is below the upper dominance threshold. Consequently, we show that there is a discontinuity in the utility differential as the threshold approaches the upper dominance region. This complicates the one-sided strategic complementarities argument.
Environment
We revisit the global games model of banking proposed by Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) .
The economy extends over three dates t ∈ {0, 1, 2} and there is no discounting. A single good is used for consumption and investment. There is a unit continuum of investors i ∈ [0, 1], each endowed with one unit of the good at the initial date. As in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) , each investor privately learns his individual preference ω i ∈ {0, 1} at the interim date. An impatient investor (ω i = 1) values interim-date consumption only. By contrast, a patient investor (ω i = 0) is indifferent between interim-date and final-date consumption:
where c t is consumption at date t. The initial-date probability of facing idiosyncratic liquidity risk, Pr{ω i = 1} ≡ λ ∈ (0, 1), is identical and independent across investors and equals the economy-wide proportion of impatient investors at the interim date. The utility function u(c) is twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave. The relative risk aversion,
, exceeds unity for c ≥ 1. 6 We follow Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) in imposing u(0) ≡ 0, which is without loss of generality if the utility at zero is bounded.
A constant-return-to-scale investment technology is publicly available at the initial date. Departing from Diamond and Dybvig (1983) , Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) introduce investment risk, whereby the gross return on investment is R in the good state and zero in the bad state. Let θ be the economy's fundamental, which can be interpreted as a macroeconomic indicator. The good state occurs with probability p(θ), an arbitrary continuously differentiable function that strictly increases in the fundamental, p (θ) > 0. The investment technology has a positive expected net present value, E θ [p(θ)]R > 1. Investment can be liquidated at par at the interim date. Storage is available at the interim date and yields a 6 Diamond and Dybvig (1983) show that this assumption generates risk-sharing in the first-best allocation without investment risk. In the Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) setting with investment risk, Elamin (2013) provides a stronger condition for risk sharing to occur in the first-best allocation.
unit gross return at the final date. Holding liquidity at t = 0 is dominated by investment.
There is incomplete information about the fundamental. At the interim date it is drawn from a uniform distribution, θ ∼ U [0, 1], but not publicly observed. Each investor receives a noisy private signal at the interim date:
where the idiosyncratic noise is independent of the fundamental and identically and inde-
At the initial date, a competitive bank offers a demand-deposit contract to maximize the expected utility of its investors. 7 Unlike in Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) , where the contract only specified a promised return at the interim date, the demand-deposit contract we consider consists of two parts.
First, an investor who withdraws at the interim date is promised a fixed return 1 < r 1 < R 1+λ(R−1)
. 8 By pooling resources, the demand-deposit contract insures investors against the idiosyncratic liquidity risk as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) . Upon observing their private information, investors simultaneously decide whether to withdraw from the bank or not. Let n ≥ λ denote the proportion of investors who withdraw at the interim date. The bank can fulfill the promised interim-date return r 1 only if sufficiently few investors withdraw, n ≤ 1 r 1 . When the bank is insolvent, n > 1 r 1 , an investor is paid r 1 only with probability 1 nr 1 (sequential service constraint). 7 Since the autarky allocation is feasible, the contract offered by the bank yields at least the same expected utility to investors. Hence, investors always deposit their endowment with the bank at the initial date.
8 The provided upper bound on r 1 is more restrictive than that in Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) . In particular, R 1+λ(R−1) < min{ 1 λ , R}, where the right-hand side is the bound in Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) . In more subgames than considered by Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) investors always withdraw from the bank, irrespective of the fundamental. This upper bound also applies to Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) , where insurance against investment risk is absent. See also section 3.4.
9 In Diamond and Dybvig (1983) , the sequential service constraint prevents the interim-date payment r 1 from depending on the withdrawal volume n. Likewise, the promised interim-date payment in Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) is independent of withdrawals and any information about the realized fundamental θ. This is identical to what we consider for the first part of the contract.
Second, an investor who does not withdraw at the interim date receives an equal share of the bank's final-date assets. These assets comprise the investment return and the storage of additional interim-date liquidation (safe asset holdings). Although Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) introduce risky investment into the setup of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) , they do not consider insurance against such investment risk. Our contract allows a solvent bank at the interim date to liquidate an additional amount of the investment to insure the remaining risk-averse investors against the risk of a low return. Investors who do not withdraw at the interim date must be patient. The bank's investment after withdrawals at the interim date is 1 − nr 1 and it liquidates a per-capita amount 0 ≤ y(n, r 1 ) ≤ 1−nr 1 1−n for insurance purpose.
Working backwards, we start by finding the bank's liquidation policy y * (n, r 1 ) at the end of the interim date for any given withdrawal volume n and promised interim return r 1 .
Next, we move to the withdrawal decision of investors at the beginning of the interim date.
Using their private information, investors update their belief about the fundamental and the proportion of withdrawing investors. Each investor withdraws if and only if the private signal is sufficiently low, θ i < θ * (r 1 ). Finally, we find the optimal interim-date return r * 1 promised by the bank at the initial date. (Carlsson and van Damme (1993) , Morris and Shin (2003) ). That is, for high values of the fundamental, the liquidation value increases from 1 to R and the investment always succeeds. That is, there exists a θ ∈ (0, 1) such that p(θ) = 1 for all θ > θ and the liquidation value is R. 10 Except for this upper dominance region, the probability of the good state strictly increases in the fundamental and the liquidation value is 1. We assumē θ < 1−2 , so this bound can be arbitrarily close to 1 as → 0. Subsequently, we consider this limit and the upper dominance region shrinks to a point. The improvement in the liquidation value is crucial for establishing the upper dominance region (θ, 1] . If the fundamental is in the upper dominance region, withdrawing does not pose a negative externality on those who do not withdraw. Each unit liquidated at the interim date is worth R but only r 1 < R is paid out. 11 The upper dominance region exists in all subgames by assumption.
To show that a lower dominance region exists, we assume that the lowest possible fundamental leads to certain default, p(0) = 0. This natural assumption is sufficient for the existence of a lower dominance region in all subgames.
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Insurance against investment risk
We start by analyzing the optimal insurance against the investment risk. If the bank is insolvent, 1 − nr 1 ≤ 0, each investor receives r 1 with probability
, as implied by the sequential service constraint. No resources remain for non-withdrawing investors and insurance is absent, y * (n, r 1 ) = 0. This result is unchanged from Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) .
10 Unlike the lower dominance region, this upper dominance region is assumed and is independent of r 1 .
11 If the fundamental is in the upper dominance region, the incentive of an investor to withdraw actually decreases in the proportion of withdrawing investors. Each investor who withdraws generates an extra amount of resources R − r 1 , which can be distributed to non-withdrawing investors.
12 We show that the lower dominance region has an endogenously generated non-zero bound which depends on the interim return r 1 , as we explain in section 3.4.
In contrast, if the bank is solvent, the amount 1 − nr 1 > 0 of investment is available for non-withdrawing patient investors. Departing from Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) , the bank optimally chooses how much of this amount to liquidate, while keeping the remainder in- What information is available to the bank when determining the optimal insurance of the remaining patient investors against investment risk? We assume that the bank observes the realization of the fundamental at the interim date. This assumption might seem innocuous, given that we consider vanishing noise. It is innocuous in the following sense: the unique equilibrium under this assumption is still an equilibrium when the bank receives a private signal, and forms a posterior on θ, given the signal and the realized n.
13 Because the bank's information is more precise, we base the optimization problem on its information.
Therefore, the bank solves the following optimization problem at the end of the interim date:
All investment is liquidated, y * = 1−nr 1 1−n , if the realized fundamental is sufficiently low,
If the fundamental is high enough, p(θ)R > 1, it is optimal to keep some of the resources invested, y
. Provided that marginal utility at zero is sufficiently high, which we assume throughout this paper, some insurance is always optimal, y * > 0. 14 This interior solution is determined by the first order condition:
13 Each patient investor bases his withdrawal decision at the interim date on his private information θ i of the fundamental. This gives rise to the aggregate number of withdrawals n observed by the bank. The bank uses the observed n and its signal, to form a posterior about the fundamental θ. Therefore, the insurance would be based on a posterior, but for small s that would be very close to what we have here.
14 Elamin (2013) provides a more detailed analysis of optimal insurance when investors do not receive private information about investment risk.
We characterized the optimal insurance against investment risk in terms of n and θ.
The number of early withdrawals n is an equilibrium object that depends on the realized fundamental θ through the investors' equilibrium strategies. Nevertheless, we now solve for the optimal expected utility in three auxiliary problems, where this dependence between n and θ is broken. These will be useful in establishing subsequent results on existence of lower dominance region and the one-sided strategic complementarity property. In section 3.1, we fix the fundamental at an arbitrary level p(θ), and vary n. In section 3.2, we fix both n and p(θ) and vary r 1 . And in section 3.3, we fix n at an arbitrary level where the bank is solvent and vary the fundamental.
Interim-date expected utility and proportion of withdrawals
In this subsection, we fix the information of the bank at some level θ, so p(θ) is constant.
We derive the optimal expected utility of a non-withdrawing patient investor as a function of n. As n increases, consumption decreases in both the good state and the bad state. The logic of this result is explained in Elamin (2013) : an increase in n decreases the resources available for consumption by a patient investor. As a result, it will be optimal to decrease both consumption levels.
, both the consumption in the good state and the bad state decrease in n. Therefore, the expected utility decreases in n.
Proof: See Appendix A.1.
Interim-date expected utility and interim-date return
We now fix λ ≤ n ≤ 1 r 1 (solvent bank) and θ. We show that the optimal expected utility of a non-withdrawing investor decreases in r 1 , the interim-date return that insures investors at the initial date against idiosyncratic liquidity risk. Just as in subsection 3.1, higher values of r 1 leave less resources for remaining patient investors. Therefore, the optimal expected utility decreases in r 1 .
Lemma 2 For a solvent bank, λ ≤ n ≤ 1 r 1
, fix both n and θ. The consumption level in both the good and the bad state decrease in r 1 and so does the optimal expected utility of non-withdrawing patient investor.
Proof: See Appendix A.2.
Interim-date expected utility and the fundamental
In this subsection, we fix λ ≤ n ≤ 1 r 1
. We show that the optimal expected utility is increasing and continuous in the fundamental θ if the fundamental takes an intermediate value.
In the higher and lower dominance regions, no extra liquidation or full liquidation occurs, respectively. In both these cases, the optimal expected utility does not depend on the fundamental. Let p −1 denote the inverse of p(θ) for all 0 ≤ θ ≤ θ. Over this domain, p(.) is strictly increasing and thus invertible.
, fix n independent of the fundamental θ. If the fundamental takes an intermediate value, p −1 1 R < θ < θ, the interim-date optimal expected utility of a non-withdrawing patient investor is continuous and strictly increasing in θ. Otherwise, the optimal expected utility is independent of the fundamental.
Proof: See Appendix A.3.
Lower Dominance Region
The upper dominance region exists and is independent of r 1 by assumption. By contrast, the lower dominance region naturally arises from the withdrawal subgame between investors and thus depends on r 1 . Specifically, the range of the lower dominance region increases in the interim return r 1 . Every r 1 in the domain 1 < r 1 < R 1+λ(R−1) defines a withdrawal subgame.
The global games techniques we use require the existence of a nontrivial upper dominance region and lower dominance region in each subgame defined by r 1 . In this subsection, we focus on the sufficiency of the assumption p(0) = 0 for the existence of a lower dominance regions across the entire domain of r 1 , and on the necessity of the upper bound
, the lower dominance region is the whole domain of θ. First, when
, we have u(
. Thus, ∀p(θ) < 1 and all n ≥ λ, each patient investor has a dominant strategy to withdraw from the bank, so n = 1 holds independent of θ. Second, when
, we even have u(
. Thus, ∀p(θ) ≤ 1 and all n ≥ λ, each patient investor has a dominant strategy to withdraw, and again n = 1 independent of θ. Both cases yield θ = 1. Hence, if we assume an upper dominance region, there would not exist intermediate region, since these dominance regions collide at θ.
Next, we consider the interesting case of r 1 < R 1+λ(R−1)
, so u(
. When p(θ) = 1 and n = λ, each patient investor prefers to wait. Thus, we can show that a lower dominance region exists with some bound θ < 1. The interval 1 − θ > 0 allows us to assume an upper dominance region on a portion of it, leaving space for an intermediate region. 15 The exactly same logic carries through in the setup Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) . Hence, the bound on r 1 we provide should replace min{ 1 λ , R} in their paper. Our bound is lower,
We next show that θ(r 1 ) increases in r 1 .
Lemma 5 The bound that defines the lower dominance region, θ(r 1 ), increases in r 1 . It converges to 1 as r 1 goes to the upper bound,
.
Proof: See Appendix A.5.
Withdrawal behavior of investors
Having solved for the optimal insurance against investment risk, we now analyze the withdrawal behavior of investors. At the interim date, each feasible interim return r 1 defines a subgame in which investors simultaneously decide whether to withdraw. An investor's decision is based on their type (patient or impatient) and their signal of the fundamental. An impatient investor always withdraws at the interim date. The incentive of a patient investor to withdraw depends on both the realized fundamental θ and the proportion of withdrawals n. The signal provides a patient investor with relevant information about the proportion of withdrawing patient investors, and the possible level of fundamental. Following the notation of Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) , let v(θ, n) denote the utility differential between not withdrawing and withdrawing at the interim date. If the fundamental is in the upper dominance region, θ ≥ θ, the utility differential is u(
If the fundamental is not in the upper dominance region, the utility differential is:
16 If insurance against investment risk was absent, y * = 0, the utility differential collapses to the expression in Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) , which is p(θ)u(
To establish one-sided strategic complementarity as in Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) , we show that the utility differential decreases in the proportion of early withdrawals when the bank is solvent (λ ≤ n < 1 r 1 ). This is already shown in Lemma 1. At n = 1 r 1 , the differential becomes −u(r 1 ) < 0. If the bank is insolvent n ≥ 1 r 1 , then there is no change arising from insurance against investment risk. The utility differential increases in early withdrawals n but remains negative since − u(r 1 ) nr 1 < 0 even for n = 1, as in Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) . Figure 4 shows how the utility differential is affected by insurance against investment risk. ], insurance against investment risk increases the interim-date expected utility of a patient investor, provided that θ < θ. In contrast, for an insolvent bank, n ≥ Proposition 1 Unique equilibrium in each withdrawal subgame. Given subsequent optimal insurance against investment risk, in every subgame determined by r 1 ∈ 1,
, there exists an upper bound on private noise (r 1 ) > 0 such that a unique Bayesian equilibrium exists for every 0 < < . This equilibrium is characterized by a threshold θ (r 1 ), below which a bank run occurs, θ < θ (r 1 ).
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Proof: See Appendix A.6.
The proof provided here simplifies, explains and extends the proof in Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) . We identify some issues and caveats that arise, and shows that these do not affect the main result. The proof works in three steps. First, we show there is a unique symmetric threshold candidate for an equilibrium. Therefore, there exists only one θ that all patient investors can use as a threshold, where each investor is indifferent between running and not when receiving this threshold as a signal. That is, the net incentive from withdrawing, the integral ∆ r 1 (θ , n(., θ )), is zero at exactly one θ . 18 Second, we show that the candidate threshold of step 1 is actually an equilibrium. Assume that all investors except investor i play threshold strategies at the θ computed in step 1, i s unique best response is to use a threshold strategy at that θ . Third, we show that any equilibrium has to be the threshold equilibrium identified.
Continuity of withdrawal threshold in noise
Uniqueness of the threshold θ * ( ) at every positive > 0 does not imply convergence to a unique limit as private noise vanishes. Indeed, it may converge to two or many limits. In this subsection, we prove that it converges to a unique limit. The same result holds in Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) , and the proofs of that are very similar to those in our environment.
Note that θ * ( ) is defined for every > 0 by Proposition 1. We show that it is continuous for every > 0. Next, we show that, as → 0, θ * ( ) converges to a unique limit that we define as θ * (0).
Proposition 2 Continuity. The withdrawal threshold θ * ( ) is continuous in for every > 0.
Proof: See Appendix A.7.
We show next that there is a unique limit which θ * ( ) converges to with every sequence going to zero. This limit will be defined as θ * (0).
Proposition 3 There exists a unique limit of θ * ( n ) for every sequence { n } with n → 0.
Proof: See Appendix A.8.
We have already shown that θ * ( ) converges when → 0. By dominated convergence theorem, the following explicit expression of θ * (0) obtains and we call it θ * from now on.
Proposition 4 As private noise vanishes, the unique limit of the withdrawal threshold θ * is defined by:
Proof: See Appendix A.9.
Liquidity risk sharing and bank fragility
As in Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) , increased liquidity risk sharing has a destabilizing effect.
A higher interim return r 1 allows for more risk sharing, but comes at the cost of an increased probability of a bank run. We show that the threshold increases in the interim return r 1 .
Goldstein and Pauzner (2005)'s proof of this monotonicity theorem relies on operating on the indifference equation at strictly positive noise, and then showing that the theorem holds when is small. Therefore, they prove this result for small levels of private noise.
When the threshold is continuous with respect to noise, as we showed in the previous section, operating as in Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) is equivalent to working directly with the limit indifference condition (which we do here). We expand on this equivalence in Appendix B.
Proposition 5 Liquidity risk sharing and bank fragility. The withdrawal threshold θ * (r 1 ) increases in the interim return r 1 .
Proof: See Appendix A.10.
5 Comparison with Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) In this section, we describe the effect of insurance against investment risk on the results of Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) . In section 5.1, we show that such insurance lowers the probability of a run, and therefore that the costs of liquidity provision are overestimated in Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) . Risk-averse investors have less incentive to withdraw at the interim date when insured against investment risk.
In section 5.2, we describe the effect of this insurance on ex-ante expected utility.
Insurance affects three contingencies that comprise the ex-ante expected utility: expected utility when the bank fails (
), expected utility when the bank does not fail, but the investor is impatient (λu(r 1 )), and when the investor is patient. Because insurance lowers the run probability, less weight is put on the first contingency than the second, yielding a lower expected utility in the combination of these two contingencies with insurance.
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19 Note that
. The third contingency, yields higher expected utility because of the combined effect of the decrease in the run probability, and the increase in expected utility from insurance. The increase in this third contingency dominates the decrease in the convex combination of the first two, and we get that the ex-ante expected utility of an investor increases in every subgame.
Insurance lowers the withdrawal threshold in each subgame
We start by identifying the subgames in which the bank provides so much liquidity (very high r 1 ) that a bank run always occurs (θ * = 1). 20 First, there is no guarantee that the withdrawal threshold θ * computed in Proposition 4 is below 1 for all r 1 . Indeed, we showed in Lemma 5 that θ(r 1 ) converges to 1 as r 1 goes to the upper bound,
. Second, when r 1 is close to 1, the threshold satisfies θ * < 1. By Proposition 5, θ * (r 1 ) is increasing
, we already showed that θ = 1, therefore θ * = 1. Therefore, by the intermediate value theorem, we have that there exists an r 1 such that θ * (r 1 ) = 1 ∀r 1 ≥ r 1 .
The next proposition shows that in every subgame defined by r 1 < r 1 , the threshold we compute with insurance against investment risk θ * is lower than θ * GP , the threshold in Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) . Both thresholds are unity in subgames with r 1 > r 1 . Note that θ * GP hits 1 before θ * does. Therefore, some subgames would have θ * GP = 1, while θ * < 1. This proposition shows that insurance against investment risk, or holding safe assets, decreases the probability of a bank run, and therefore decreases financial fragility.
Proposition 6 Lower withdrawal threshold than Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) .
Consider subgames in which the withdrawal threshold with insurance against investment risk is below one, θ * < 1 for all r 1 < r 1 . Then, the withdrawal threshold with insurance is lower 20 It is important to note that the ex-ante optimal interim return r * 1 should be different than these.
than the withdrawal threshold without insurance:
Proof: See Appendix A.11.
For convenience, we include the formulas for these thresholds here:
The intuition for this result is clear. Fix a subgame given by r 1 and consider each proportion of early withdrawals n. The total amount of resources available to patient investors is the same, irrespective of insurance against investment risk. However, the given amount of resources are used more efficiently from the perspective of a patient investor, when insurance is present. That is, the expected utility with insurance is strictly higher than the expected insurance without such insurance (GP). Note that the expected utility of withdrawing is fixed at u(r 1 ) r 1
(1−λr 1 +ln(r 1 )) in both cases, but the expected utility of a patient investor who does not withdraw decreases in the threshold θ * . Therefore, the marginal patient investor who is indifferent between withdrawing and waiting must have received a lower private signal under insurance than without insurance.
Insurance Raises the Ex-ante Expected Utility
The optimal insurance against investment risk and the optimal threshold equilibrium in each subgame determine an ex-ante expected utility for any given interim rate (r 1 ). In this subsection, we write the expected utility as a function of r 1 , after the upper dominance region shrinks to a point (θ → 1), and private noise vanishes ( → 0). In each subgame determined by the interim rate r 1 , the ex-ante expected utility with insurance against investment risk is higher than without insurance.
We start with the case of no insurance. The ex-ante expected utility in Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) for any given r 1 is:
With insurance against investment risk, the ex-ante expected utility for a given r 1 is:
where y * = y * (r 1 , λ, p(θ)) and therefore y * depends on the realized θ whenever θ ≥ θ * . This complicates the integrated expression, because unlike in Equation 8, the utility itself depends on the realized fundamental through the insurance.
The next proposition shows that insurance against investment risk raises the initialdate expected utility of investors for each interim rate r 1 .
Proposition 7 At any fixed interim rate ∀ r 1 < r 1 , the expected utility with insurance against investment risk is greater than that without such insurance:
Proof: See Appendix A.12.
Conclusion
We study the optimal demand-deposit contract subject to sequential service in the bank-run model of Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) . We show that competitive banks hold safe assets in order to insure risk-averse investors against investment risk. As a result, fewer investors withdraw prematurely, which reduces the probability of a bank run and increases investor welfare. Furthermore, safe asset holdings may also allow banks to provide more liquidity.
A Appendix: Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof: This is an application of Lemma 3 in Elamin (2013).
Case 1: We start by considering the corner solutions. If p(θ)R ≤ 1, then full liquidation occurs, so y = 1−nr 1 1−n and y = 1−n r 1 1−n . Thus n > n implies y < y. Since the respective expected utility in case of full liquidation equals u(y) and u(y ), it decreases in n.
Case 2: If p(θ)R > 1 but θ < θ, we get an interior solution. Let n > n, y > 0 and y > 0 be the optimal insurance that solve the respective optimization problems in 3. The first order condition of the problems give:
First, assume y = y. Thus
by strict concavity, resulting in n = n .
Contradiction.
Second, assume y > y. Then, by strict concavity, we have u (y ) < u (y). Thus, for equation 11 to hold, we require:u
. Therefore, again by strict concavity,
, which implies n < n. Contradiction. This shows that y < y and the consumption level in the bad state decreases in n.
y < y implies u (y ) > u (y). Equation 11 implies that: u
R − y (R − 1) and the consumption level in the good state also decreases in n. Since the consumption in both states decrease in n, so does the expected utility of a non-withdrawing investor at the interim date.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof: This is another application of Lemma 3 in Elamin (2013) . Cases 1 and 2 deal with corner solutions.
Case 1: If θ ≥ θ, then p(θ) = 1 and the investment is riskless. All resources remain invested and there is no need for insurance, y * = 0. The expected utility at the interim date is u(
), which decreases in r 1 .
Case 2: If p(θ)R ≤ 1, the expected return on investment is below the liquidation value, so full liquidation occurs. The expected utility at the interim date becomes u(
which also decreases in r 1 .
Case 3: We focus next on an interior solution, which occurs if p(θ)R > 1 but θ < θ.
Let r 1 > r 1 , and let y and y solve the respective maximization problems. The first-order conditions of these problems give:
First, assume y = y. This implies
by strict inequality and thus r 1 = r 1 .
Contradiction.
Second, assume y > y. Then, by strict concavity: u (y ) < u (y). Steps very similar to Lemma 1 lead to the required contradiction.
Therefore, the consumption levels in both states decrease in r 1 , and so does the interimdate expected utility of the non-withdrawing patient investor.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof: Case 1: Corner solutions. If p(θ)R ≤ 1, full liquidation occurs and the optimal interim-date expected utility becomes u(
). In this case, the expected utility does not depend on the fundamental. Likewise, if θ ≥ θ, there is no need for insurance, y * = 0. The expected utility at the interim date is u(
, which is independent of the fundamental.
Case 2: We now focus on the (more relevant) range of fundamentals that yield an interior solution, p(θ)R > 1 but θ < θ. The continuity of y * in θ follows from continuity of marginal utility, u (.), and the continuity of p(.). Thus, the continuity of the optimal expected utility in θ follows.
To prove that the optimal expected utility increases in the fundamental, let p > p as a short hand for θ > θ. Moreover, let the optimal insurance level against investment risk be y and y, corresponding to p and p. By optimality of y and strict concavity of utility function:
We also have y < 1−nr 1 1−n from the interior solution of this case (see also the constraint of Problem 3). Therefore, u
Since p > p, we have:
Combining both of these inequalities proves strict monotonicity.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 4
Proof: Consider a fixed r 1 ∈ (1,
). If the bank is insolvent, withdrawing from the bank at the interim date yields u(r 1 ) nr 1 in expected utility terms, while waiting yields u(0) = 0.
Therefore, a patient investor always prefers to withdraw. When the bank is solvent, to use the intermediate value theorem, we show that the expected utility differential is negative at θ = 0 and positive on the upper dominance region. Fix n = λ for now. At θ = 0, the investment fails for sure by assumption of p(0) = 0. Therefore, all investment is liquidated,
. Thus, a non-withdrawing patient investor's expected utility at the interim date is: u(
, which is strictly below u(r 1 ) because r 1 > 1, the lower bound on r 1 . When θ ≥ θ, the investment is guaranteed to succeed, p(θ) = 1. Optimal insurance against investment risk is zero, y * = 0, and all resources remain invested. The interim-date expected utility becomes u(
, which is strictly above u(r 1 ), because r 1 < R 1+λ(R−1)
, the upper bound on r 1 .
For each r 1 , by the continuity of expected utility in θ at n = λ (Lemma 3) and the intermediate value theorem, there exists a cut-off θ(r 1 ) defined by:
Since the expected utility increases in θ when n = λ by Lemma 3, we have for any θ < θ(r 1 ) that p(θ)u
Because the optimal expected utility at the interim date decreases in n at every θ < θ, Lemma 1 shows that for all n > λ, the patient investor still has a dominant strategy to withdraw at the interim date. This establishes a lower dominance region for every r 1 in the domain and concludes our proof.
A.5 Proof of Lemma 5
Proof: Let r 1 > r 1 , y and y solve the respective maximization problems with the associated bound θ and θ. We have that: p(θ) u
When r 1 increases to r 1 , the expected utility evaluated at p(θ) decreases by Lemma 2.
But to raise the expected utility to u(r 1 ) > u(r 1 ), Lemma 3 shows that we need to increase θ. This establishes strict monotonicity of θ(r 1 ) in r 1 . The discussion at the beginning of the section shows that θ = 1 when r 1 = R 1+λ(R−1)
. This concludes our short proof.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 1
A threshold strategy for investor i is a mapping from possible interim-date returns r 1 to a threshold signal: θ i :
+ → [0, 1] s.t. i runs when his signal is below the threshold (θ i < θ i ) and does not run when it is above (θ i ≥ θ i ). We assume that the strategy is doubly measurable in i and r 1 .
The first step assumes we are looking for a symmetric threshold equilibrium. By showing a potential candidate at a unique θ , we rule out the possibility of two symmetric threshold equilibria θ 1 (r 1 ) and θ 2 (r 1 ). Assume all investors except i use the same threshold θ (r 1 ). By the law of large numbers, i s belief n(θ, θ (r 1 )) about the proportion of investors who run at the true fundamental θ is degenerate 21 and defined by:
i 's utility differential at the interim date becomes:
Combining these two definitions, let v(θ) = v(θ, n(θ, θ )). This is i's utility difference at the true fundamental θ, when all investors beside i use a threshold strategy at θ . i does not observe the true fundamental θ however, only a signal θ i . His posterior of θ at signal θ i is uniform over the interval
We will show that i's integral of net incentives when he receives the threshold θ as a signal: ∆ r 1 (θ , n(., θ )) intersects zero at exactly one point θ = θ * , is negative below it and positive above it, and therefore provide a unique potential threshold that could serve as a symmetric equilibrium.
22
To analyze the integral, we first plot the function v(θ) and focus on when the threshold θ is far from the upper dominance region (θ + ≤ θ). v(θ) achieves its minimum value at fundamentalθ ∈ (θ − , θ + ), where the proportion of investors running is equal to 
24
We now analyze what happens as the threshold θ increases, but is still below the upper dominance region. Evaluating n(θ, θ ) = 1 r 1 leads to θ −θ = (
. Therefore, the 22 This only establishes a possible candidate. To show the candidate is an equilibrium, we have to show monotonicity of ∆ r1 (θ i , n(., θ )) as a function of the signal θ i . 23 For λ < n(θ, θ (r 1 )) < 1, n(., θ (r 1 )) has an inverse function since it is linearly decreasing over that segment. Therefore, letθ = θ : n(θ, θ (r 1 )) = 1 r1 . By the intermediate value theoremθ exists, and θ − < θ < θ + .
24 Although by assumption the upper dominance region is greater than 2 , for expositional purposes, it is drawn as smaller than the interval [θ − , θ + ]. are expected to run, when they are sure they are in the upper dominance region. Therefore, irrespective of where the threshold θ is, v(θ) is constant at u(
On the interval [θ − , θ), the graph of v(θ) is similar to when the threshold was far from the upper dominance region. A minor difference from before concernsθ. Ifθ < θ, then v(θ) decreases first, achieves its minimum atθ, then increases and exhibits a point of discontinuity at θ. Whenθ ≥ θ however, v(θ) decreases and approaches an infimum value at θ but never achieves it. It still exhibits the point of discontinuity at θ. At θ ≥ θ, v(θ) has a peculiar feature. When the threshold was far from the upper dominance region, v(θ) was constant at u(
25
Unlike in regions below the upper dominance region, u( R−nr 1 1−n R)−u(r 1 ) is actually increasing in n. We experience a reversal in the incentives, more investors running is good news. Since there is no default in this region, an increase in θ mainly means an increase in the proportion 25 This expression is positive, since
1−n is increasing in n (r 1 < R), R > 1, and
of running investors (n). Therefore, on the domain θ ∈ [θ, θ + ], v(θ) decreases in θ but remains positive, until it becomes constant at u(
, when θ is above θ + . It is useful to keep in mind that u(
is still greater than the greatest expected utility that could be achieved on the domain below θ. This will be useful when we show the integral still increases later on. To minimize the clutter on the graph, Figure 6 plots v(θ) assuming that θ = θ, andθ > θ. It is easy to see how the graph would be different whenθ < θ. We note here that this analysis is crucial for understanding what happens in some of the subgames when r 1 is high enough. We will prove later that the threshold θ * (r 1 ) is increasing in r 1 , we know it is definitely 1 when it is close to its upper bound
. Therefore, the analysis here is crucial for understanding the resulting behavior in some of the subgames even when noise vanishes and the upper dominance region shrinks to a point. The crucial aspect here is that the decreasing portion of the integral does not cross zero, since u(
Having understood the v(θ) function and how it changes with the threshold, we are ready to tackle how ∆ r 1 (θ , n(., θ )) behaves. To show existence and uniqueness of a potential threshold, we will first show that ∆ r 1 (θ , n(., θ )) is continuous in θ . It starts negative when θ is close to 0, increases until it is positive, and then decreases while remaining positive.
The intermediate value theorem then proves our claim.
Lemma 6 ∆ r 1 (θ , n(., θ )) is cont in θ .
Proof: The integrand is bounded making the continuity of the integral straightforward.
Because the discontinuity in v(θ) is a simple discontinuity, it has no effect on the continuity of the integral.
Lemma 7 ∃ s.t. ∆ r 1 (θ , n(., θ )) increases in θ then decreases. It is positive when it starts decreasing and remains positive after the decrease.
Proof: The graphical description of the v(θ) function and how it changes with the threshold constitutes most of the proof. We only provide here a lower bound on the decreasing portion of the integral and show that it is bounded away from zero. Once the integral starts to decline, this means that as the threshold θ is increasing, portions of v(θ) = u(
with n and therefore decreasing in θ. Therefore, the decreasing portion of the integral is bounded below by 2 (u(
That the integral is positive on the higher part of the upper dominance region when is small enough is clear by the positive lower bound on the decreasing portion we showed in the proof before. Similarly in the lower dominance region, fix r 1 > 1, we have that θ(r 1 ) > 0. 
In step 2, we look at how ∆ r 1 (θ i , n(., θ * )) varies as θ i the signal that i receives increases.
We know it is zero at θ i = θ * . We show it is negative for all θ < θ * , and positive for all θ > θ * , thereby showing a threshold best response by investor i at θ * , when all investors use a threshold strategy at θ * . We also show continuity and use intermediate value theorem to wrap up step 2 of the proof.
Lemma 8 Function ∆ r 1 (θ i , n(., θ * (r 1 ))) is continuous in θ i .
Proof: v(θ) is bounded and only has simple discontinuities, therefore the integral is continuous.
Lemma 9 ∃ s.t. the function ∆ r 1 (θ i , n(., θ * (r 1 ))) starts negative and decreasing in θ i and then bottoms out and increases till it is positive, and remains positive after that.
Proof: The integral ∆ r 1 (θ i , n(., θ * (r 1 ))) starts constant at −2 u(r 1 ) r 1 when θ i < θ − 2 . It decreases on the downward sliding chunk of v(θ). A bit of thinking shows that it bottoms out at the θ that achieves the following infimum:
After that point, 26 if this is not achieved because θ is close to the upper dominance region, the same logic carries through.
as θ i increases, the integral substitutes values of v(θ + ) which are higher than the v(θ i − ) that get dropped out of the integral. Therefore, the integral increases. Straightforwardly, the integral is positive when θ i >θ + . If θ is close to the upper dominance region, there is a decreasing part of the integral once it is positive, but it remains positive after the decrease.
We now focus on step 3. We consider the finitely many thresholds case first, and then a special case of the proof for the general case. We refer the reader to Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) for an expansion on the general case. Rank the finite thresholds, pick the highest two and apply the following procedure. Call these two thresholds: (θ * 1 and θ * 2 ). Now note that at each θ in the interval (θ * 1 , θ * 2 ), some investors are supposed to run at that θ and some are not. This can only happen when ∆ r 1 (θ, n(.)) = 0. Therefore, the integral is constant at zero and on this portion v(θ, n) increases in θ, so again we are dropping higher and adding lower values to the integral, and the integral declines. In both cases, the integral can not be constant at zero. This wraps up the finite threshold case.
For the general case, we assume all the measurability restrictions on the strategies that would get us a measurable n(.) function and an integrable v(.) function. Now the integral of net incentives at signal θ i has the usual definition: ∆ r 1 (θ i , n(.))) = 1 2
because v(θ) is bounded, the integral is continuous.
Let θ B = sup{θ i : ∆ r 1 (θ i , n(.))) ≤ 0}. By continuity, ∆ r 1 (θ B , n(.))) = 0. If we are not in a threshold equilibrium, there are signals below θ B at which ∆ r 1 (θ i , n(.))) ≥ 0. Letθ A be their supremum. θ A = sup{θ i < θ B : ∆ r 1 (θ i , n(.))) ≥ 0}. By continuity, ∆ r 1 (θ A , n(.))) = 0.
We focus here only on the case where the distance between θ A and θ B is greater than 2 . Let the range (θ B − , θ B + ) be called d B and similarly (θ A − , θ A + ) be called d A . Because of the threshold nature of θ B and θ A , as θ declines from θ B to θ A , n(.) can not decrease. So both θ and n(.) decrease, and therefore v(θ) can only decrease. Assuming ∆ r 1 (θ B , n(.))) = 0, then ∆ r 1 (θ A , n(.))) = 0. Figure 7 illustrates the points discussed. This contradiction concludes the proof. 
A.7 Proof of Proposition 2
The first lemma establishes that the optimal insurance does not depend directly on the noise , but only indirectly through n and θ.
Lemma 10 For a given n, y * depends on through θ.
Proof: First assume 1 = 2 . At the same n and θ, both problems have the same first order condition 4. Therefore by strict concavity, y * (n, θ, 1 ) = y * (n, θ, 2 ). And y * does not depend directly on .
Now we show the dependence through θ( ). When θ( 1 ) = θ( 2 ) and at the same n, the first order condition 4, shows that:
Therefore by strict concavity, y * (n, θ( 1 )) = y * (n, θ( 2 )).
The next lemma determines the relationship between θ * ( 1 ) and θ * ( 2 ) for different s.
Lemma 11 ∀ 1 = 2 > 0, the following equation holds:
Proof: At any , an investor with signal θ * ( ) is indifferent between running and not running. The following definition will be useful. Defineθ as the θ at which n(θ, θ * (r 1 )) =
We know thatθ ∈ (θ * − , θ * + ).
Expected utility of not running when the investor receives the threshold as a signal:
Expected utility of running:
So we have that:
We use the fact that n = λ + (1 − λ)(
) to change the integration variables:
dn, also using Lemma 10, we get:
Therefore we have the following equation:
Note that the right hand side of the equation is independent of . Plugging in 1 and 2 , transitivity gives us Equation 14.
Contrapositive. Assume ∃x > 0 at which θ * ( ) is not continuous. Then ∃{ n } a sequence with n > 0 s.
∀n >n. But then by choosing n close enough to x, ∃n (we abuse notation here) s.t.
for all run proportions λ ≤ n ≤ 1 r 1
. Note that the n inside the equation denotes run proportion while the n in n is for counting.
By using Lemma 3, we show that the expected utility at θ( n ) − (1 − 2
x for all n. But then the integral of the expected utility across n, still preserve the same sign which contradicts Lemma 11.
In other words,
The contradiction with Lemma 11 completes the proof.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 3 θ * ( n ) has a convergent subsequence, for any sequence { n } going to zero. We will show there can not be two subsequential limits and that proves the proposition.
The idea of the proof follows the proof of Proposition 2. We sketch it here. Contrapositive, assume there are two subsequential limits. Then there are two sequences converging to those two different limits. One limit is greater than the other. But then we can find two elements along the two sequences, call them x and n , close enough to each other (since they are close to zero) s.t. Inequality 17 holds.
A.9 Proof of Proposition 4
We first note that the proof of Lemma 3 contains a discussion on why y * is continuous in p, which we will use here.
Let g(n) = p(θ * )u 
We use the dominated convergence theorem to get: 
In other words, the lhs is equal to the negative of r 1 multiplied by the expected derivative minus the expected utility and the last two positive terms. The difference between us and (1 − λr 1 )
We note here that lim →0 ∂f ∂r 1
= ∂g ∂r 1
and lim →0 ∂f ∂θ * = ∂g ∂θ * .
This is an application of the following theorem from real analysis:
Theorem 1 
